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STATE MANAGEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
PART ONE: AN EVALUATION OF
THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCEt

Geoffrey J. Lanning*
I. A PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW

Michigan's citizens, as well as its government, seem but dimly
aware of the fact that Michigan-the home of America's most
growth-centered industry, the automobile-lies at the very eye of
the environmental storm. This article seeks to take a broad look at
the shortcomings of Michigan's environmental protection in recent
years. In so doing, it groups many of Michigan's recent environmental failings into broad categories which will both clarify the
status of Michigan's environmental law climate and provide a basis
for its reform. Parts One and Two consist of this analysis and
evaluation. Part Three will examine possible solutions and offer
suggestions for reform.
A basic theme underlies this factual analysis: the most meaningful explanation for Michigan's many environmental problems lies
in the character of Michigan decisionmaking. Consequently, this
article will discuss the degree to which Michigan decisionmaking is

t This article is a condensation by the Journal of a more extensive unpublished work by
Professor Geoffrey Lanning. Professor Lanning's analysis differs from this article in the
former's broader scope and more detailed discussion of the environmental decisionmaking
process in Michigan. The analysis by Professor Lanning is on file with the author at Wayne
State University Law School.
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1939; LL.B., 1942, Harvard University.
This article is premised upon a survey of Michigan's environmental problems during the
past several years. It includes the results of interviews and discussions with many of the
participants in, or observers of, the efforts to deal with these problems. These interviews
and contacts were conducted by the writer. A list of interviews is on file with the author.
Mr. Phil Bozzo and Ms. Margaret McCormick are students at Wayne State University
Law School. The broad coverage attempted in the study from which this article is taken
would not have been possible without the long hours of work and thoughtful analysis
contributed by Ms. McCormick. Mr. Bozzo performed useful research and was helpful in
many ways. Research assistance was also rendered by Diana Lemanek, Shari Danch, and
David Marvin, students at Wayne State University Law School. The assistance received
from all of these students is acknowledged and appreciated.
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open to general public interests and to broad public goals. These
decision processes are unresponsive to the need to protect against
such modern perils as nuclear accidents or toxic substances, while
they are sensitive to the more limited interests that are focused on
productivity and growth.
This effort to survey Michigan's environmental record over the
past several years also bears some relevance to another basic environmental controversy: the issue of how effective state government is, and can be, in dealing with the full range of environmental
problems, from those which are purely local to those which are
national in scope.
The federal-state controversies in the environmental area offer a
clear example of the unending controversy between centralization
and decentralization. People in state government may consider
themselves closer to the people and to the local scene; they argue
that the will of distant Washington bureaucrats should not be imposed upon them. Many in the federal government believe that
environmental problems often transcend local boundaries and can
only be dealt with effectively on a regional or national basis.
A major factor in the growth of federal authority has been the
capacity of states to deal successfully with local pressures, conflicts of interest, or lack of resources. All of these factors are
reflected in this analysis of Michigan's environmental record. Land
use policy and planning is an obvious example.' The resistance of
local interests has barred the adoption of the methods and perspectives needed to deal with many land use problems that transcend
local boundaries. Unless local interests permit the state authorities
some range of effective action, they will be confronted with the
intrusion of federal authority. This has already come to pass in the

' See PART Two of this article.
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areas of air 2 and water: quality, 4 and intervention is threatened
through the federal government's granting or withholding of funds
5
in order to influence suburban land use planning.
In view of the successful efforts by special interest groups in
Michigan to thwart effective state-wide environmental efforts, 6 the
federal government has begun to insist that if there is no immediate
and effective state action, federal authority will intervene. 7 It will
thus become more difficult for Michigan to retain its local autonomy in the face of the growing urgency of many of the state's
environmental problems, responses to which are, at best, at a preplanning stage. Federal agencies have already assumed a large
voice in state programs, and the limitations of current state efforts
suggest that this federal intervention may increase. An analysis of
the Michigan Water Resource Commission (WRC) Act's recent

2 The Federal Clean Air Amendments of 1970,42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1957(l)(1970) ("Clean
Air Act"), have preliminary language describing the problem involving primary state responsibilities. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2. However, the statute provides that if the states do not
adopt implementation plans satisfactory to the federal administrators, the federal government may develop and substitute its own plans. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c). Unlike the language
in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), the federal threat did not scare
Michigan into enacting a significantly improved state air pollution control act, nor even into
significantly improving its current enforcement. It is not clear why the same reservation of
powers in the federal government that so frightened Michigan industry with respect to water
quality did not have a comparable effect on Michigan's air pollution legislation. See letter
from EPA Acting Regional Administrator, Region V, to Geoffrey Lanning, Dec. 26, 1972
(on file at Wayne State University Law School), which concluded that while the Michigan
Air Pollution Implementation Plan met legal requirements, Michigan's laws in the area
would benefit from stronger measures. However, in statements (analyzing the state implementation plan) submitted to the Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission by the
author on December 13 and 17, 1971, a number of the weaknesses of existing Michigan air
pollution legislation were cited. These included inadequate and uneven sanctions and penalties; the failure to eliminate undue representation of polluter interests on the Michigan Air
Pollution Control Commission; the lack of any central coordinating committee; the remarkable claim that automobile air pollution is not a major problem in Michigan; and the lack of
provision for any correlation between transportation and land use patterns, air poluting
emissions, and public health. Such defects in the underlying law appear fundamental and
make it difficult to justify the position of the federal EPA.
3 The statutory pattern of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1972), might seem quite similar to that of the Michigan Air Act, but the
federal confrontation has been quite different. The FWPCA has language describing water
pollution control as mainly the responsibility of the states. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(b) (Supp. 1972).
If the states do not enforce the FWPCA in a manner satisfactory to the federal administrators, then the federal government may take over enforcement. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp.
1972). Michigan responded by passing two laws which considerably strengthened Michigan
water pollution control. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 323.1 et seq. (1967, as amended, Supp.
1973).
' See Note, Michigan Water Resources Commission Act Amendments: A Response to
the Federal Water Pollution ControlAmendments of 1972, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 455,
461 (1974) [hereinafter cited as WRC Note].
See section VII in PART Two of this article.
6 See section IV C infra.
See notes 2-4 supra.
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amendments suggests that the prior Michigan water quality law
was defective in content, sanctions, procedures, and
administration, 8 and that the recent legislation correcting some of
these defects9 would never have been enacted except for concern
that the federal government would intervene.' 0 If this analysis is
accurate, then it may be of limited value to seek state solutions to
environmental problems, a possibility that will be examined in Part
Three of this article.
Turning, then, to Michigan's efforts to solve its environmental
problems at the state and local level, we must first confront the
conceptual obstacles to effective legislative and administrative action.
II. THE SCOPE AND REALITY OF MICHIGAN's
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

A. Introduction

It is, perhaps, not surprising that there is significant debate about
whether there is an environmental "problem." The many distinguished authorities who have argued that the world is in a rapidly
intensifying environmental crisis 1 ' have been accused of being
prophets of gloom and doom, 1 2 and it is argued that, like Malthus,
the modern environmentalists are far too pessimistic.1 3 The author
has conducted a general survey of Michigan's environmental problems, including interviews with some of Michigan's environmental
14
experts and with others working, or knowledgeable, in the area.
The results of this general inquiry do not support the suggestion of
the president of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce' 5 that those
who seek substantial land use controls for Michigan are merely a
"calamity lobby."
There can be no question as to the importance and urgency of
Michigan's environmental problems and of their relevance for all
8 WRC Note, supra note 4.

9 No. 293, [19721 MICH. PUB. ACTS 76th Sess. amending MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §
323.1; No. 3, [19731 MICH. PUB. ACTS 77th Sess. amending MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
436.19(e). See also note 2 supra.
10See notes 2-4 and accompanying text supra.
I

See B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971); P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION

BOMB (1968). See also Allaby, Allen, Davoll, Goldsmith & Lawrence, A Blue Print for
Survival, 2 ECOLOGIST 1 (1972), and note 24 infra.
12Hall, Land Use for Economic Expansion, 1972 MICHIGAN CHALLENGE II
(Aug./Sep.); Book Review The Limits to Growth, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1972, § 7,at 1.
13Profits of Doom, 3 ECOLOGIST 121 (1973); St. John, Environmentalists are "Irrational," N.Y. Times, Jan. 1,1973, at 23, col. 2.
14A list of those interviewed is on file with the author.
15 Hall, supra note 12.
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citizens. Only the more basic problems will be discussed in this
article. The scope and complexity of even this selected list underlines the importance of the state government's assuming proper

leadership.
Among the most important of our specific environmental problems are those that directly affect the public safety and health. A
dramatic example of this is the large scale construction of nuclear
power plants in Michigan. Both the Governor and the Public Service Commission have implicitly encouraged this extensive nuclear
construction, 16 and there are no signs that the state has considered
or explored its possible powers to limit such construction, despite
the dangers of the escape of radioactivity or of explosive accidents

at the plants and in the transportation and disposal of radioactive
wastes.1 7 These perils were dramatized by negligent construction

at one plant 18 and a major nuclear accident at another. 19 At the

16The Governor proudly proclaimed in his environmental message of Jan. 22, 1970, to the
legislature that: "Michigan, in the near future, will be generating more electric power from
nuclear reactors than any other state." There is no evidence that the Governor or the Public
Service Commission took action at any time to discourage nuclear construction in Michigan
or to insist that the many questions being raised about the safety of nuclear reactors and the
related transportation and disposal of radioactive materials be resolved before the state
welcomed a high level of nuclear production. While the Governor's environmental messages
of January 22, 1970, and February 4, 1971, did urge emergency controls, licensing, and
on-site inspections, there was no suggestion that Michigan should limit nuclear construc-

tion.
" An extensive literature documents the efforts of the Atomic Energy Commission to
conceal the extent of dangers posed by nuclear construction. See, e.g., R. LEWIS, THE

NUCLEAR

POWER-REBELLION:

CITIZENS

VS.

THE

ATOMIC

INDUSTRIAL

ESTABLISHMENT (1972); Gofman & Tamplin, The Law and Survival in a Technological
Era, 2 PACIFIC L. J. 603 (1971); Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability and Indemnity, 71
MICH. L. REV. 479 (1973); Novick, Nuclear Breeders, 16 ENVIRONMENT MAGAZINE 6
(July/August 1974); Tamplin, The BEIR Report: A Focus on Issues, 1973 SCIENCE AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 19 (May).
In an unusual bureaucratic admission, James Schlesinger, then chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission, stated that the agency would shift from fighting the industry's political,
social, and commercial battles to "serving the public interest." Lyons, AEC Shifts Role to
Protect Public, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1971, at 1, col. 6. Unfortunately, that promise never
materialized. See, e.g., Book Review, 1973 SCIENCE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 45 (May).
See also Hearings on Environmental Effects of Energy Generation on Lake Michigan
Before the Energy Subcomm. of the Senate Commerce Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970) (an example of early warnings that to date have done little to stem the tide of
Michigan's nuclear construction, or related practies).
"SDetroit Free Press, Apr. 8, 1973, at 3A, col. 2; Utility's Nuclear Nightmare, Detroit
Free Press, Feb. 17, 1974, at IB, col. 5. In July, 1974, the Atomic Energy Commission held
a hearing to determine if Consumers Power should be allowed to continue building its
Midland, Michigan, plant in view of alleged deficiencies in its quality assurance program.
Detroit News, Aug. 15, 1974, at I IA, col. I. Despite its scathing criticism of the Midland
management, the Atomic Energy Commission recently decided to let the Midland plant's
construction continue. Detroit News, Sept. 28, 1974, at 5A, col. 5.
'9 Elliott, Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power, 4 URBAN LAWYER 33, 35 n.4, 38
(1972); Detroit Free Press, Nov. 30, 1972, at 3A, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1972, at 26N,
col. 6.
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same time, the costs resulting from the failure of industry to master
the technological problems of nuclear production have been per20
mitted to enter the rate base and increase the consumer's cost.
For example, Detroit Edison's customers were charged many millions of dollars to pay for the misjudgments by the company that
21
underlay the shutdown of the Fermi nuclear plant.

Other threats to health and safety include the pollution of air and
water, especially by the inadequately regulated emission of toxic or
potentially dangerous substances. The gravity of such pollution
problems is directly proportionate to the degree to which the
decision-making process responds to these perils. In Michigan, the
risk of environmental danger or damage is almost always placed on
the public rather than on the producer or developer who has

profited thereby. Nuclear production is a classic illustration of the
pattern of Michigan environmental decisions.

Another major group of environmental problems in Michigan
includes transportation, open space, and recreation, which deter-

mine the survivability of our cities. Common to many of these
specific problems is the question of land use. A dramatic example
of this can be found in recent statements by the Michigan Department of Agriculture that Michigan has already lost so much agricultural land to other uses that it will be unable to feed its people
by the end of the century; by that time, Michigan will have only 2.5

million acres remaining of an original 6.5 million acres of agricul22
tural land.
This summary listing reveals the serious extent of Michigan's
environmental problem and how little the state government has

done toward achieving even the modest goals it set forth at the
height of the environmental enthusiasm of 1969-1971.23 A compen-

20 See Earth Beat (a Michigan environmental newspaper), Jan. 25, 1974, at 2; id., Feb. 8,
1974, at 2, 3. The author's interviews with persons in the Attorney General's office and
elsewhere indicate that many millions of dollars of the excess construction costs of the
Palisades nuclear plant over its estimated cost will enter the Consumers Power rate base.
(Interviews on file with the author).
21 Detroit Free Press, Nov. 30, 1972, at 3A, col. 7.
22 Detroit Free Press, Mar. II, 1973, at 3A, col. 3, 7A, col. 1.
23 See Governor Milliken's Special Message to the Legislature on Recreation and Environmental Quality, March 7, 1969. The message lists various recreational and environmental problems but evidences neither a coordinated approach nor a viable sense of
priorities. Citizen health, economic, and social factors were placed at the bottom of the list.
The Governor's Special Message to the Legislature on the Environment, February 4, 1971,
evidenced a somewhat more realistic order of priorities. Most of the problems mentioned in
the two messages remain unsolved.
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dium of the individual problems is misleading because it does not
adequately define the limits of Michigan's environmental
difficulties. Michigan's inadequate performance can be explained
by interrelated factors which proceed from one of the basic weaknesses of a closed decisionmaking system: undue sensitivity to
narrow economic interests and the basic distribution of power in
our society.
B. Economic Growth and the EnvironmentThe Basic Clash of Values and Priorities

The environmental crisis proceeds from the contradictions between, on one side, growth and increasing productivity and, on the
other, the preservation of natural and human environments. This
contradiction is particularly important for Michigan, where the
economy is centered on a single major growth industry. Now that
the American frontier is closed, economic health must be found in
ways that will not destroy the natural system upon which it depends. The efforts to accomplish this have not been assisted by the
theories of most market economists, which assume that unceasing
24
economic expansion is both necessary and inevitable.
Some Michigan organizations have recognized the true scope of
the environmental problem and have urged population limitation
and other steps to help bring a gradual adjustment to a stable
economy. 25 Such an economy would need to be labor-intensive,
providing a greater emphasis on services, culture, and the
amenities of life, rather than on the rapid consumption and disposal
of raw materials and capital resources, It is, however, doubtful that
insights of this kind could penetrate the Michigan government's
bureaucracy, which has generally rejected efforts to only partially
restrict development or production even where it threatened irreparable injury. For example, the United Auto Workers' suggestion that the Tilden Dam controversy over jobs (i.e., economic
growth) and the environment be resolved in favor of both by pump-

24 This factor apparently explains why most economists have been less than objective
about the computer-based, systems analysis of W. BHERENS 11I, D. MEADOWS, & J.
RANDERS, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972). The Limits to Growth concludes that we must
either stabilize the world economy within several generations or face apocalyptic collapse of
society as we have known it. At the United Nations Conference on the Environment at
Stockholm in 1972, business lobbyists such as Lord Zuckerman, the science adviser to the
Tory Prime Minister of England, were harsh and strident in decrying the "pessimism" of
The Limits to Growth. But their criticisms and their alternative proposals contained little
beyond their optimistic and boundless faith in technology's ability to solve all problems.
25 Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1971, at 7B, col. 5.
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ing in water from Lake Superior (thus avoiding largely unnecessary
construction of an environmentally injurious dam) 2 6 was rejected
by the DNR in favor of constructing the dam. The injury to one of
the few remaining wetlands in the Detroit metropolitan area (by
dumping polluted dredging spoil) was assured by the resolution of
the Pointe Mouille case,2 7 in favor of commercial traffic.
Other examples of agencies that have emphasized construction
and productivity, while remaining unreceptive to more general and
politically less powerful public interests, are the Drain Commissioners and the Department of Natural Resources Hydrologic
Survey. The Drain Commissioners have the kind of pervasive
political power on the local level which the Army Corps of Engineers has at the federal level; the power of both groups derives
from the multi-million dollar, productivity-oriented construction
projects which they control. 2 8 Proposed legislation would have
transferred to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) the power of environmental review over drainage and similar projects throughout the state. 29 The legislation was never passed. The Governor then attempted by Executive Order to shift
review authority over drainage regulation from the Agriculture
Department (dominated by farmers who favor drains for production) and the Drain Commissioners to DNR. But the Drain Commissioners forced the Governor to abandon this effort. 30 Further
evidence of the effect on decisionmaking of the clash between
economic growth and the environment is found in the current controversy over "nondegradation" of environmental quality. To require "nondegradation" is to bar industrial expansion into or
within a given geographic area. Any industrial process is likely to
use air or water or both as the "free" conduit for its emissions. The
DNR Hydrologic Survey deliberately deleted from a draft of the
Inland Lakes and Streams Act the strong "nondegradation" (of
26 Detroit Free Press, June 2, 1972, at 12C, col. 1. The Tilden Dam and Mine project is
considered in detail in notes 118-27 and accompanying text infra.
27 Statements of Findings, Alternative Disposal Site for Detroit and Rouge Rivers, Monroe County, Michigan, March 27, 1974; Final Environmental Statement: Confined Disposal
Facility at Pointe Mouille for Detroit and Rouge Rivers, U.S. Army Engineer District.
Public opposition to the original Corps plan ultimately resulted in its substantial
modification and improvement. Detroit Free Press, June 16, 1974, at 8E, col. 1. In this case,
the decision favoring growth over the preservation of the environment was made by a
federal bureaucracy. But Army Corps of Engineers' decisions are reached in close harmony
with local and state industrial and political interests. See A. MAAS, MUDDY WATERS (1951);
Douglas, The Public Be Damned, PLAYBOY 143 (July, 1969); Findley, The Planning of a
Corps of Engineers Reservoir Project:Law, Economics, and Politics, 3 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1
(1973).
28 Detroit Free Press, Mar. 6, 1972, at 4B, col. 1.
Id.
30 Detroit Free Press, Mar. 8, 1973, at 13A, col. 3.
29
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water quality) language and persuaded the legislature to substitute
weak, ambiguous language ("no unlawful pollution") in the final
draft. 31 The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is,
in contrast to the period of accomplishment under William
Ruckleshaus, 32 seeking to frustrate the federal court decisions
which have strictly upheld the nondegradation requirements of
federal air pollution law. 33 The EPA's device for doing so is to
transfer to the states the basic administration of this aspect of air
quality, particularly by giving the states the severe and highly
controverted burden of maintaining nondegradation. 34 The burden
is administratively and politically overwhelming for the average
state administration, and both the EPA and Michigan state agencies appear to be aware of this fact. While the Michigan Attorney
General joined most environmentalists in condemning the EPA
actions as an "authorization for run-away pollution," the Michigan
Air Pollution Control Commission (MAPCC) has called the EPA
strategy "a step forward." 35 Also, the MAPCC Air Pollution Implementation Plan (under the 1970 Air Pollution Control Act) not
only failed to follow the national policy against further degradation
pursued what can be termed only as a
of existing air quality, but
36
policy.
pro-degradation
The operation and structure of many decisionmaking processes
are receptive to production interests and less open to other public
interests. These factors include legal impediments in the form of a
burden of proof in favor of economic activity, narrow access to the
judicial and administrative 37arenas, solutions with a
"nuisance-internalization" focus, and government research emphasizing the most "productive" areas of inquiry. 38 Furthermore,
the mechanics of environmental decisionmaking may favor productivity interests by having decisions referred to many productivity
interests within the department itself.

31 MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.951-956 (Supp. 1973). See North Woods Call, July
18, 1973, at 1, 8.
32See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 17, 1973, at 14C, col. 6; id., Aug. 28, 1973, at 15C, col. 1;
id., Aug. 22, 1974, at 32C, col. 2.
33Id.
a4 The new EPA rules commented upon in notes 32-33 supra essentially charge the states
with the difficult determination of "significant deterioration." See EPA Rules Would Give
States Authority to Determine 'Significant Deterioration,' [1974] ENVIRONMENT REP.
507-08.
"' North Woods Call, Oct. 9, 1974, at 7.
3' See note 32 supra. See also section VI in PART Two of this article.
11 See section VI in PART Two of this article.
38 See Conclusion in PART Two of this article.
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The potential ramifications of these clashes will be examined
further in Part Three of this article. For example, the distribution
of resources has an even greater impact upon environmental problems as the economic frontier recedes into memory. Indeed, this is
one of the many points at which the international character of the
environmental crisis becomes most apparent. For example, it
would be literally impossible for the 800 million Chinese to reach
the level of affluence found in America. The world has neither the
resources nor the ability to withstand environmental insults to
permit this. Since the world's resources will not permit the underdeveloped countries to reach American standards of life, these

nations may force a radical redistribution of resources. In this
regard, concentration of wealth is particularly significant in
Michigan, where there are few countervailing forces to the automobile industry and the rest of the industrial lobby. Intrinsic
patterns of Michigan culture, education, and society may well re-

flect the overwhelming influence of the automobile industry and its
materialistic priorities.
In a number of states, excluding Michigan, there has been some

3 9
perception of what all this might mean. California, Delaware,
and a number of other states 40 have enacted limits on development

or construction in environmentally fragile areas. But in Michigan a
fierce resistance to any governmental encroachment upon the unrestricted property right of the individual (and as a corollary, to
any regional or state encroachment on the powers of local govern-

ment), underlay the rejection of all land use planning at the state
level.

39 Lamm & Davison, The Legal Control of Population Growth and Distribution in a
Quality Environment: The Land Use Alternatives, 49 DENVER L.J. 1, 28-29 (1972); CAL.
PuB. RES. CODE § 6301 et seq. (West 1956, as amended, Supp. 1971). This California
statute tightly regulates the development of coastal and estuarine areas in order to protect
them from environmental harm. The system resembles that of several other states, where a
permit is required before significant alteration of a coastal region is permitted. The permits
are issued only after the negative environmental impacts are found to be negligible and
where development does not otherwise contravene the public interest. Delaware has taken
an even more restrictive approach to coastal development. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7001 et
seq. (1971). Delaware does not use a permit system but bars highly polluting types of
industry from both the land and sea areas of its coastline. See Note, Land-Use Management
in Delaware Coastal Zone, 6 U. MicH. J .L. REFORM 251, 257-58 (1972) (a discussion of the
Delaware practice and a summary of the approaches of some other states).
40 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22- 7h to 7o (1971); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-136
to -147 (Supp. 1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-58 (Supp. 1972); N.J. REV.
Stat. §§ 13:9A-1 to -10 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229, § 112-230 (Supp. 1971).
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III. MICHIGAN'S CLOSED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING PROCESS: A FORMAT FOR ANALYSIS

The more important factors that explain the Michigan environmental decisionmaking system and its operation are described
herein. Any isolation of individual factors is arbitrary, for the decisionmaking process is as much an integrated reflection of the
entire society as the environment itself, and is equally demanding
of integrated treatment.
The nature and character of Michigan's system of environmental
decisionmaking is examined in terms of the structure (e.g.,
bureaucracy) and the internal and external factors (e.g., conflict of
interest, special interest pressures, possible wrong-doing, or corruption) that shape the system.
The structure of an administrative decision system is often described as "bureaucratic" to the extent that decisions are handled
by a large, formal organization. It is more useful in this article to
treat "bureaucracy" as referring to the tendency of such organizations to serve some narrow set of purposes rather than the broad
public goals for which they supposedly were created.4 1 Internal
bureaucratic malfunctioning is enmeshed with the powerful external forces that play upon and intensify its weaknesses. These
weaknesses include conflicts of interest, which are a blend of internal weaknesses and external influences. Bureaucratic dysfunction also involves special interest pressures, which, though acceptable in an open, fair lobbying system, lead into areas of possible
wrong-doing or outright corruption.
A basic factor behind the power and range of special interest
pressures is the relative amorality of a society focused on development, productivity, and growth. It is rare that the dubious
character of many special interest pressures is even recognized,
much less rejected. As a consequence, decisions are largely devoid
of considerations of general public interests, public safety, conservation of resources, beauty, or equitable distribution of social values. This article seeks to document these broad propositions in
terms of recent Michigan experience. The theoretical and
philosophical underpinnings for these views have been dealt with
elsewhere 42 and will not be reiterated.

41 See notes 48-50 and accompanying text infra for a more detailed definition of "bureaucracy."
42 See, e.g., Lanning, Injustice and the Environment: A Moral Dilemma (publication
forthcoming in a book by the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social
Philosophy).
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Following a consideration of the structure of the Michigan system and the factors that determine its general form, the related
operational shortcomings of Michigan environmental decision processes are considered. These shortcomings include the failure to
implement environmental laws or obligations, ranging from inadequate, incompetent, or nonexistent enforcement, to the lack of
adequate, consistent legislation. It extends to even more fundamental matters of inadequate perspective and inadequate planning,
including the lack of an integrated approach to environmental
planning and management.
There is a direct correlation between bureaucracy's rejection of
imaginative ideas, and the lack of environmental planning and
management. Dramatic illustrations of the ways in which the
bureaucratic mind is closed to ideas that are new, different, or
controversial are fairly recent statements by two of Michigan's top
environmental officials. A top official of DNR's environmental
protection division objected strongly to opening up department
procedures to public participation, stating, "There is potential for
disruptive action by those elements of the American public who
espouse disorder or by agents of other powers." ,43 This statement
was no mere aberration; though the former director of DNR dubbed the official "dumb," he gave him a full pardon on the ground
that an assistant had written the statement and that the official had
only signed it. 44 In view of the commanding importance of the
official's role in the DNR, the episode can not be brushed off as the
careless release of an extreme opinion. Significantly, one newspaper report of the incident charged that this official received and
has retained his high position in DNR as a result of political pressures from industrial interests 45 who apparently like his point of
view.
Similarly, the Chairman of the Michigan Natural Resources
Commission (NRC) (who is the owner of a printing company)
complained in an article for the Michigan Chamber of Commerce's
publication about the "plain harassment of business" by "environmental kooks," lamenting that business is held suspect and is
forced to prove its honesty.4 6 While this is not an unusual point of
view for industry publicists, it seems somewhat strange coming
from the head of Michigan's top environmental agency. It also
tends to illustrate the interrelationship of such individual factors as
43 North Woods Call, May 30, 1973, at 3.

44Id.
45Id.
46 Detroit Free Press, Oct. 8, 1973, at 12A, col. 1.
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conflict of interest, lack of environmental understanding, failure to
implement environmental laws, and the favoring of economic
growth.
A factor common to much of this analysis (and which will be
considered later in some detail)47 is that Michigan's concept and
administration of its environmental problems are often limited to
the narrow, individualistic remedies of market economics, as embodied in the nuisance-type approaches of the common law. In
brief, a major shortcoming of Michigan environmental governance
is that it deals with the problem as a set of individual conflicts. As a
consequence, the tools used to deal with environmental problems
are often fines, tax penalties, and incentives, rather than the overall
management approach that the character of environmental issues
requires.
IV.

THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF THE SYSTEM

A group of factors, including bureaucracy, conflicts of interest,
special interest pressures, and possible wrongdoing, explain why
the decisionmaking process is susceptible to internal or external
pressures. These factors derive from one of the basic weaknesses
of a closed system - its sensitivity to narrow, special interests.
A. Bureaucracy

The term "bureaucracy" has been used primarily to describe the
impact of organizational structure upon the accomplishment of its
various goals. Presthus commented that most bureaucracies have
large size, specialization of functions, hierarchical organization,
"status anxiety," rule by the few, successorship selection by the
organization's elite, "efficiency," and rationality.48 Robert
Michaels, in developing his "iron law of oigarchy," suggested that
labor unions could not achieve their progressive reforms without
the firm organization of a hierarchical bureaucracy, but he concluded that the stronger the organization becomes, the more conservative and more focused on its internal goals it becomes. 49 Administrative law attempts to prevent bureaucratic abuses by large
government agencies, but it runs a perilous course between inade-

41 See section VI in PART Two of this article.
4s R. PRESTHUS, THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 27 (1962).
49 P. BLAU, BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN SOCIETY 93-94 (1956).
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quate standards of review, such as "substantial evidence" and
"rational basis," 50 and excessive judicial interference. More likely
the better approach to the problem is to tackle bureaucratic abuses
at their source, rather than to refine standards of administrative
review.
In considering "bureaucracy" this article is concerned more
with the operations of goverment agencies than with the labor
unions with which Michaels was concerned or the business corporations which Presthus studied. Although the enforcement of some
of Michigan's environmental protection laws may pose the basic
controversy between economic growth and the environment, the
agency's public interest charter will ordinarily be clear and
specific. Therefore, a broad and comprehensive definition of
bureaucracy which encompasses many of the earlier definitions
and which explains many of Michigan's environmental shortcomings is appropriate. Although a Michigan agency may have been
established for a broad public purpose it often serves the interests
it was supposed to regulate or emphasizes the viewpoints of the
people running the agency. Bureaucracy must be understood in
terms of the gap between the public mission assigned to a large
organization and the private purposes it actually serves.
A good illustration of bureaucratic obstacles to environmental
protection can be found in the natural gas eruptions that resulted
from negligent gas well drilling in the vicinity of Williamsburg,
Michigan. An oil company dug a deep gas well but failed to install a
metal casing down to the bottom of the well, as prudence and good
practice would seem to require. The resultant gas eruptions routed
a number of families from their homes, muddied streams, and
threatened humans and wildlife in the area. The oil company allegedly failed to install the shaft casing because of the extra cost
involved; the DNR oil well drilling regulations did not require this
precaution. 51 DNR officials argued that such an accident would
not happen again, but similar accidents had occurred at least twice
in Michigan during the previous five years. 5 2 Inadequate drilling
regulations may have been the result of incompetence-one of the
major weaknesses of bureaucracy. Only after the Williamsburg
accident did DNR issue an emergency order requiring insertion of
intermediate casing in all deep wells.5 3 A retired DNR expert
50 J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1970); Small, The National Environmental
Policy Act: What Standard of Judicial Review, 39 J. AIR L. 643 (1973); Sive, Some
Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70

COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970).

51 1963 Annual Administrative Code R. 299.1101 et seq. (as amended, 1971 Supp.).
52 Detroit Free Press, Apr. 16, 1973, at 3A.
13Mich. Dep't of Natural Resources Bull. 2, Apr. 25, 1973.
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charged that the DNR geologists' partiality to the oil industry was
responsible for the perpetuation of faulty drilling practices that
54
saved the oil companies money but endangered the public.

Some bureaucratic shortcomings are due to factors outside
agency control. Budget and staff limitations pose obstacles to

DNR's carrying out its stated public missions; promises of environmental protection mean little unless supported with the
necessary money. 5 5 If inadequate budgets force Michigan agencies
to continue to rely on experts from the very industries which are to
56
be regulated, then regulation is likely to remain inadequate.

The Water Resources Commission's (WRC) approval of a Dow
Chemical Company plan to put dams on the Pine River is a classic
example of the functioning of bureaucracy. WRC approved the
plan on the grounds that it would create reservoirs that could be

used for recreation and for control of the river's flow. But the
Ingham County Circuit Court found that the reservoirs probably
could not be used for recreation and that there was no demon-

strated need for river control.5 7 In short, the court found that the
river was being dammed primarily for the benefit of Dow and other
private industry. The bureaucratic failure to distinguish public
purposes from the private purposes served by the Dow plan led to
the Pine River holding.
The Pine River holding approaches the position that agency ac-

tions with a substantially adverse environmental impact can not be
upheld, irrespective of the extent to which agency procedures take
account of such environmental impacts. 58 The case appears to hold
that agency action based on private advantage will not be sustained

54 Detroit Free Press, Apr. 26, 1973, at 3A, col. 2.
51 DNR continues to be short of staff and resources. It lacks funds to hire adequate expert

assistance, its salary levels limit the calibre of its personnel, and it will pursue unwise
policies in order to make up for lack of funds, as with its oil and gas leasing policies. Cuts in
the DNR payroll may result when the Governor fails to support some of the DNR's special
requests, as where the legislature refused to approve a DNR proposal to increase the fishing
license fee, funds from which help support its operations. North Woods Call, July 25, 1973,
at 6; id., Dec. 12, 1973, at I. While the Michigan Executive Budget for 1974-1975 did include
a significant increase for DNR, much of the difference has been consumed by inflation; only
about half of the increase will go towards improved or expanded environmental or natural
resource programs. North Woods Call, Aug. 7, 1974, at 3.
5' See, e.g., North Woods Call, Feb. 5, 1973, at 2.
51 Foster v. DNR, WRC, State of Michigan et al.,
Dkt. No. 9906-C (lngham County Cir.
Ct. 1972) (summarized in the Detroit Free Press, June 6, 1972, at 3A, col. 5).
58 Several courts have applied substantive, rather than procedural, criteria to the judicial
review of federal environmental impact statements under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v.
A.E.C., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
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unless it can also be justified by significant public advantage. In
other words, agency action may be overturned, not because of a
procedural failure to consider environmental factors, but because
the result of the action is oriented solely towards private productivity interests. Application of this public purpose doctrine-which
goes even further than the "public trust" doctrine-would make it
much easier to reverse bureaucratic actions, the impact of which is
environmentally negative. But if this doctrine were too broadly
applied, it might present some of the basic constitutional and political problems posed when the courts rely upon "substantive due
process." The Pine River case probably goes about as far into the
making of substantive policy as the judicial process should.5 9
Apparently the Pine River "substantive" approach will not be
restricted to public trust situations where agency action is assailed
as being almost exclusively directed toward private rather than
public advantage. The Michigan Supreme Court has recently held
in State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot 60 that the provision of
the Michigan Constitution that "the legislature shall provide for
the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the
state from pollution, impairment, and destruction, ' 61 is satisfied
by the enactment of the Environmental Protection Act of 1970.62
The court held that the Act's provision-which forbids such pollution, impairment, or destruction unless "there is no feasible and
prudent alternative" to the conduct, which conduct must be con63
sistent with the state's public environmental protection goals
-is incorporated not only procedurally, but also substantively,
into pertinent state statutes such as the Highway Condemnation
Act. 64 The court concluded that the Act is not simply a procedural
route for protection of environmental quality but also is a source of
65
substantive environmental law.
Despite this language, the State Highway Comm'n opinion is
not clear about the differences between procedural and substantive
review of environmental decisions. Review is "substantive" if the
courts overturn an agency action because they find that its decision
was incorrect in environmental terms. Review is "procedural" if
the agency decision is overturned because the agency failed to give
formal consideration to all relevant environmental factors. Proba-

'9
See PART THREE of this article.
60 392 Mich. 159, 220 N.W.2d 416 (1974).
61 MICH. CONST. art. 4 § 52 (1963).
62 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75).
63 MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. 1691.1203 (Supp. 1974-75).
64 MICH. Cosp. LAWS ANN. § 213.361 et seq. (1966), as amended (Supp. 1974-75).

15392 Mich. 159, 184, 220 N.W.2d 416, 427-28 (1974).
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bly the supreme court meant merely to emphasize that administrative agencies must give formal consideration to the environmental
factors specified in the Michigan Constitution and in the Environmental Protection Act of 1970.66 It is unlikely, despite the use of
the term "substantive due process" early in the opinion, 67 that the
court meant that agency decisions might be reversed where the
agency had procedurally considered all environmental factors and
alternatives, but where the substantive balance of factors 68
indicated
that the proposed action was environmentally incorrect.
Briefly, and based on the lack of express wording in the
Michigan Constitution to impose a requirement of "necessity"
when property is taken by condemnation, the supreme court held
that under the Highway Condemnation Act 69 the Highway Department need not prove necessity for the overall highway project,
but only for the taking of a particular piece of private property.70

It is difficult to reconcile the broad thrust of the court's holding
that environmental protection is a matter of substantive due process with a position that denies judicial review on environmental
grounds of the need for a particular transportation project, although such projects are among the most destructive of all environmental dangers. Unless State Highway Comm'n can be
clarified, the limited value of litigation in providing environmental
protection in Michigan will be further diminished.
The failure of the Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) to
exert any authority or review, or even to require public hearings
with respect to the hundreds of miles of power lines that the power
companies have built in Michigan serves as an appropriate example of how narrow bureaucratic approaches can deny the public

66 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75).
67 392 Mich. 159, 169, 220 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1974).
68 The supreme court in State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159, 184,

220 N.W.2d 416, 426 (1974), cites Sax and Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection
Act of 1970:A ProgressReport, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1004, 1054-64 (1972) for the proposition
that the Act is a source of substantive environmental law. However, Sax and Conner make
it clear that
The question of the EPA [i.e., the Act] as a source of substantive law arises
whenever a defendant asserts that he has no obligation to take environmental
considerations into account in the performance of the challenged activity. ...
Id. at 1055.
69 MICH. Comp. LAVS ANN. §§ 213.361-391 (1968), as amended (Supp. 1974-75).
70 State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159, 170, 220 N.W. 2d 416, 423.
The author acknowledges the benefits of the thoughtful insights of David Marvin's note in
21 Wayne L. Rev. (publication forthcoming).
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environmental protection. On occasion the lines were inadequately
tested and potentially dangerous, such as those of Detroit Edison

in Washtenaw County.7 1 Although the PSC has argued that it has
no jurisdiction over power siting in Michigan, the Attorney General has taken the opposite position. 72 Even if the PSC were correct in declining such jurisdiction (which is dubious, given the general language of the applicable laws) 73 it is remarkable that only
now is the PSC starting to give sufficient thought to energy policy

so that legislation may be introduced to provide PSC with the
power

necessary

to

enforce

applicable

environmental

restrictions. 74
A somewhat parallel case of an agency's bureaucratic failure to

give first priority to its public goals is the Michigan Air Pollution
Control Commission's long history of delay and reluctance in dealing with the air pollution problem presented by the Hillsdale Foundry. Since 1968 residents have been complaining of "clouds of red
dust" and other contaminants emanating from the foundry.
MAPCC staff air quality specialists had checked these complaints
nearly thirty times as of January, 1974, without ever requiring the

company to comply with state air pollution requirements. 75 Foundry officials appeared before the MAPCC a number of times to
explain why no action had been taken to correct the problem,

arguing that it would cost too much to install pollution control
equipment at the old foundry (which provides 200 jobs), and that
71 Litigation against Detroit Edison in Washtenaw County, centered on this danger, was
eventually dismissed by stipulation, according to Richard Ford, a Detroit Edison attorney.
The practical consequence was an increased condemnation award for the private litigants,
but no enhanced protection for the public. This case would appear to have offered the
Attorney General an ideal occasion to intervene or otherwise participate by using the
Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN, §§ 691.1201-.1207
(Supp. 1974-75). The Attorney General could thereby reinforce his parallel policy of intervening in PSC proceedings in order to require the PSC to take account of the environmental
impacts of its activities. Note, The Role of the Attorney General in Consumer and Environmental Protection, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1030, 1066-67 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note,
The Role of Attorney Generial].
72 At one point the PSC asked the Attorney General's office for an opinion as to whether
the PSC has the right to order public hearings on power line routes. The Attorney General's
office has stated informally that the PSC has had this power since its inception and that the
PSC has been derelict in its responsibilities. Detroit Free Press, Apr. 10, 1972, at 3A, col. 5,
8A, col. 1.
73 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 460.6 (1929), as amended (Supp. 1974-75).
"I In a memorandum of June 6, 1974, from PSC Chairman Rosenberg to William Herttiger
(the Governor's executive assistant), the PSC Chairman emphasized the need to expedite
the administrative process and to provide a "one stop forum" as a major goal of Michigan
power siting legislation. See also Kaufman, Power for the People, 46, N.Y.U.L. REV. 867
(1971); ELECTRICITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Association of the Bar of the City of New
York 1972), which explores in detail the problems of power siting and of "one-stop" licensing.
7- Detroit News, Jan. 2, 1974, at 4B, col. 6; id., Jan. 20, 1974, at 2B, col. I.
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they needed time to relocate their plant. When, after years of continued air pollution, the MAPCC told the foundry they must halt
the pollution or suspend operations by January 1, 1974, the foundry
claimed that they needed another nine months of operation so that
they could get federal money to build the new plant. 6 The
MAPCC finally took action, perhaps prodded by an unexpected
series of events. State Representative Smeekens, who had appeared before the MAPCC in behalf of the Hillsdale Foundry, was
77
discovered to be a part owner and "president" of the foundry;
the Michigan Attorney General threatened to sue the MAPCC if it
did not issue an immediate shut-down order; 78 and the public
interest-oriented member of the MAPCC publicly stated that the
rest of the Commission was refusing to enforce the law by not
79
closing the foundry.
The MAPCC, however, continued to drag its heels. When the
MAPCC finally ruled that the foundry must shut down, it failed to
make the necessary finding that the foundry was in default of the
MAPCC order to comply with the law; unfortunately, state law
allows court action in this context only when one fails to comply
with MAPCC orders.8 0 When the MAPCC finally did rule that the
Hillsdale Foundry was in default of the MAPCC order to clean up
or shut down by December, 1973, the agency still did not seek an
immediate closing of the foundry; rather, it requested that the Attorney General seek a court order which would not close the
foundry before October 1974.81
Many scientists and commentators have urged that human life
and safety as well as the environment are in the gravest of perils
from the construction and operation of nuclear power plants.8 2

76 id.
77 Detroit News, July 7, 1974, at II A, col. I. The article strongly suggests that Smeekens'
role with the company was primarily as a paid lobbyist.
78 Detroit Free Press, Apr. 19, 1974, at 3A.
79 Id.
'0 Section 5 of the Michigan Air Pollution Control Act, MICH COMP. LAws ANN. § 336.5
(Supp. 1974-75).
81 Detroit Free Press, Apr. 18, 1974, at 3A, col. 3.
82 See, e.g., Novick, supra note 17; Elliott, supra note 19; N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1974, at
16L, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1973, at i, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1974, at C-23,
col. 1. It should also be noted that the Office of Management and Budget transferred
authority to set radiation standards for individual power plants from the EPA to the AEC
-that is, from a safety agency to an agency stressing development. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12,
1973, at i, col. 2.
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This peril is in good part due to the intense bureaucratic emphasis

of the federal Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) upon the contribution to productivity and economic growth of a headlong rush
into nuclear power construction with little concern for the safety
precautions that are a major part of the AEC's charter.8 3 This
danger is compounded where a state agency such as the Michigan
PSC accepts a dangerous level of nuclear activity without any real
effort to pursue any of the possible means whereby these dangers

might be avoided.
The PSC and the State of Michigan have the duty to examine

AEC claims that the "emergency core-cooling systems" (ECCS)
designed to prevent catastrophic accidents in nuclear reactor
plants are effective. If the PSC and the Governor are actively (or

passively) accepting the claims of the AEC and of the nuclear
industry, they are exposing the Michigan public to grave danger

and putting production-centered special interests ahead of their
public duties.

Therefore, it is important to note the casual techniques by which
the Michigan bureaucracies limit public participation in their procedures. For example, DNR cited the energy crisis as an excuse to

transfer almost all of its major "public" meetings from convenient
localities around the state to Lansing. The result, of course, was
effectively to reduce public participation 84 and environmental pro-

tection by narrowing decisional input. The fact that this incident
was neither trivial nor accidental is suggested by the DNR's recently adopted policy of denying public access to intra-agency let85
ters or reports that might be critical of DNR.

Government bureaucracy plays a major role in environmental
destruction, both directly 86 and indirectly, through the failure to
require adequate environmental protection. 87 One currently popu-

lar technique for curbing these administrative obstacles, and one

" The AEC was formally split up by the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No 93-275 (1975). Research and development are placed in the Energy Research
and Development Administration (ERDA) together with the major federal programs of
research and development for all forms of energy. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(federal NRC) will handle safety problems including reactor safety and the processing,
handling, and transportation of all nuclear materials.
84 North Woods Call, Aug. 22, 1973, at 4; id., Jan. 16, 1974, at 3.
85 Detroit News, Oct. I1, 1974, at 9A, col. 1. NRC has tried to open up DNR's administrative processes by requiring DNR to present differing opinions within the agency to NRC.
North Woods Call, Nov. 20, 1974, at 3.
88 See State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159, 220 N.W.2d 416 (1974).
8 See notes 70-81 and accompanying text supra.
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which is in obvious reaction to the closed character of most
bureaucratic decisionmaking, is to follow the lead of the federal
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).8 8 NEPA requires
agencies to take formal account of the adverse environmental impacts of their proposed activities, as well as procedurally to consider all appropriate alternatives from an interdisciplinary
perspective. 8 9 Unfortunately, while NEPA has produced a huge
volume of litigation and has slowed down, and even halted, a few
harmful projects, its ultimate impact has been very limited, partly
because NEPA has generally been interpreted as being only a
procedural and not a substantive provision.9"
When the Governor originally created the Michigan Environmental Review Board (MERB) in 1973,91 it appeared to the environmentalists whom he appointed to MERB that Michigan had
learned from the experience with the federal NEPA and had
adopted an effective administrative restraint on the bureaucratic
elements of its environmental decisionmaking. Prominent environmentalist members of MERB interpreted the language of
MERB's executive order, "to coordinate the state environmental
impact review program, ' 92 as meaning that MERB would have a
substantive veto over environmentally harmful actions of state
agencies. 93 The Governor also promised the appointees that
MERB would receive a staff sufficient to make an adequate evalua94
tion of agency environmental statements.
In a typical maneuver, many state agency directors objected
fiercely to the claim that MERB had any review authority and
argued that MERB should rely on the experts of the agency submitting a project for its review. 95 In other words, the agencies
wanted to review themselves and to avoid any impartial and objec-

88 42

U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).

89 33 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).

9oSee note 58 and accompanying text supra.
9'Executive Order 1973-9 provides MERB with authority "to coordinate the state environmental impact review program" [emphasis supplied]. The Governor previously had
required all agencies to file environmental impact statements with respect to all major
activities within their jurisdiction (Executive Directive 1971-10, Sept. 30, 1971).
92 Executive Order 1973-9.
9 See North Woods Call, June 19, 1974, at 1:
It was clearly understood by environmentalists-including [Professor Joseph]
Sax and others who accepted appointments to the board [MERB]-that the
citizens could veto a state agency project, unless they were overruled by
[Governor] Milliken.
9'North Woods Call, June 19, 1974, at 5.
95Id. at 1,5.
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tive review from outside their agency. The Governor promptly
issued an amended Executive Order 9 6 which provided only that
MERB should "assist the Governor in reviewing federal and state
impact statements." The Governor argued that MERB could still
be of some use since it could make recommendations to the Governor, who could then veto harmful projects. 97 The plan assumed
that: (a) MERB would be given the resources and staff to perform
an adequate review; (b) MERB would have access to the Governor; and (c) the Governor would have the political courage and
strength to override the big agencies and their industrial and political allies. None of the above appears likely.
Most of the state's environmentalists were convinced that the
public interest had once again suffered a defeat, not only because
of the elimination of any formal authority in MERB to prevent
harmful agency actions, but also because the Governor had not
provided MERB with adequate staff and other resources. The subsequent actions make it clear that the creation of MERB was never
more than a political gesture. The Governor ultimately declined to
support legislation that would have restored MERB's powers as
98
they were originally established.

An impartial and substantive environmental review of agency
activities may still be possible if the recent Michigan Supreme
Court decision in State Highway Comm'n, 9 9 is interpreted to allow
agency actions to be overturned as "fraud or abuse of discretion"
if the agency does not comply with the substantive environmental
duties provided in the Michigan Constitution °" and the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act of 1970.101 It will still be open to the
agency to avoid reversals by sustaining the burden of proof that it
had no "feasible and prudent alternative" and that the action was
consistent with the state's environmental goals.1 0 2 The agency
need only claim that it has procedurally considered all of the environmental impacts and alternatives. The fact that only the indi-

96 Executive Order 1974-4 (May 3, 1974).
91 North Woods Call, July 24, 1974, at 1, 9.
98H. B. 6123, 1974 Legislature. After MERB was rendered impotent, State Representatives Anderson and Goemaere introduced H.B. 6123 which would have established a State
Environmental Review Board with independent agency status and an all-citizen voting
membership. North Woods Call, June 19, 1974, at 1, 5. The Governor did not support this
legislation.
11 See notes 58-70 and accompanying text supra, questioning whether State Highway
Comm'n v. Vanderkloot was an environmental victory.
10 MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 52 (1963). See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
101 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75).

102 State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159, 186, 220 N.W.2d 416, 428,
431 (1974).
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vidual party's property-not the entire highway project-was involved renders any enhanced environmental protection from State
Highway Comm'n largely illusory; the basic environmental impacts of projects will be ignored while the minor impacts on the
individual pieces of property will encounter the overkill of substantive due process.
Nevertheless, if under State Highway Comm'n agencies are
generally required to bear the burden of proof as to the substantive
environmental consequences of their activities, a significant advance in environmental protection will be effected. The legal system has remained closed to most of the general public interests
primarily because of the common law doctrine that the burden of
proof rests with those who seek to restrain or limit forces that
emphasize productivity and economic growth. 10 3 Since it may be
impossible to predict the exact consequences of many kinds of
productive activity, it is apparent that the burden of proof may be
too heavy for people who seek to restrain destructive forms of
104
production and development.
This is not to suggest that the judicial environmental review
potentially created by State Highway Comm'n is as satisfactory or
as appropriate as an effective administrative review board like
MERB. Courts can deal only with ad hoc, intermittent controversies that are brought to their attention, and are hardly in a position
to take the kind of systematic approach that is essential to effective
environmental management. In addition, since many decisions reflect value choices between economic growth and the conservation
of the natural and human environment, the absence of political
accountability of the courts further diminishes the prospects for
unified regulatory efforts.
The question remains: why, given the potential of an administrative review board such as MERB, were the big agencies able to
frustrate the Governor's attempt to set up a workable body? The
answer lies in the relationships between the big government agencies and the industrial interests that influence the state legislature.

Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAW AND
105, 107 (1st ed. 1970).
104 The Michigan Supreme Court made it clear in State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot that the effect of their incorporating the Environmental Protection Act of 1970 into the
Highway Commission's statutory duty was to leave the Commission with the burden of
proof (with respect to the "necessity" for condemning the individual piece of property). In
brief, construction and development interests bear the burden of showing at least an absence
of alternatives, and if the project-necessity holding is reversed, the net effect may be to
subject environmentally injurious projects to a much closer scrutiny.
103
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B. Conflicts of Interest

Conflicts of interest is the second in the set of factors that explains the Michigan decisionmaking process and how it is kept
responsive to limited interests rather than to public environmental
concerns. Such conflicts evidence a structural defect and imply an
absence of the impartiality necessary to solve environmental problems. The conflict may be personal conflict (e.g., an individual
who is appointed to a public body but who is still employed by,

receives income from, or has spent much of his career with, a
particular regulated industry)

0

5

involving a duty to the public and

loyalty to the regulated company.
A second and more subtle form of conflict of interest inheres in
the organizational framework of an agency. For example, if DNR

has duties to protect the environment and, simultaneously, to encourage oil and gas drilling or the construction of dams, this clash
of goals poses a conflict for departmental representatives. 10 6 An
agency's use of experts from the industry that is being regulated

reflects both of these flaws.
Both commentators' 0 7 and the federal EPA' 0 8 have noted that a

major cause of the ineffectiveness of state environmental agencies
105 One of the most characteristic explanations of official receptivity to industrial-or other
special points of view is that the official has spent some portion of his earlier career in
industry. For example, in a study of the Wayne County Air Pollution Control Division
(WAPCD) by the University of Michigan Law School in 1970 (directed by Professor Joseph
Sax), it was concluded that many of the enforcement problems of WAPCD, which is
Michigan's largest air pollution control unit, reflected a tendency to sympathize unduly with
the industrial interests it was supposed to regulate. The study attributed much of this and the
related absence of strict enforcement by WAPCD to the background of its key official, Mr.
Mort Sterling, who was an engineer and an employee of Ford Motor Company. Many of
these conclusions as to high receptivity to industrial interests are reflected in a study of
WAPCD by the School of Natural Resources, University of Michigan, March 24, 1972,
directed by Dr. James Swan [the Swan Report]. This report found WAPCD to be slack in
enforcement against business (particularly large industry) and relatively unreceptive to citizen views and general notions of the public interest.
106 The AEC's conflicting duties to protect the public from nuclear danger and to promote
nuclear development are among the most notorious examples of such organizational conflicts. In a suit against the AEC by six environmental groups, Conservation Society of
Southern Vermont v. AEC, Civ. Action No. 19-72 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the plaintiffs contended that the AEC combination of regulatory and promotional functions violates due
process. The significance of such organizational conflicts was recognized by the old
Governor's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). In its report of December 15, 1970,
to the Governor, the CEQ recommended that a new Environmental Agency replace DNR
and that it be divided into Natural Resources and Environmental Quality divisions. The
split-up of the AEC into what appear to be separate safety and research-development
agencies (see note 83 supra) may render the Conservation Society case moot, but the AEC's
history of support by military and industrial interests, and the policies of the Ford administration, mandate continued scrutiny of the new operation.
107 A New York Times investigation in 1972 by Gladwin Hill concluded that most state
air and water pollution control boards are heavily loaded with representatives of the polluters. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1972, at 37, col. 7.
108 Id.
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is the presence on their governing bodies of representatives of the
polluting industries (or their indirect representation in the form of
interested bureaucrats). Michigan has done little to remedy this
situation. The state legislature has been unwilling to increase public representation or to give public representatives a majority on
state environmental agencies,10 9 and the Governor has appointed
to leadership posts a proportionally high number of polluter representatives. The lack of strong, publicly focused leadership contributes substantially to the dismal record.
Seemingly innocuous duties can also help to produce the closed
decisionmaking atmosphere of the Michigan bureaucracy. For example, the Director of DNR also serves as Supervisor of Wells.110
The impact of such organizational conflicts of interest upon the
DNR's ability to discharge its duties to safeguard the public and
the environment from the adverse consequences of oil and gas
drilling is clear. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that
an important segment of DNR revenues comes from the leases it
grants to the oil and gas industry."'
A final factor is that of interdepartmental conflicts. Large
bureaucratic organizations often fight among themselves for prestige and position, and thereby further distract their attention from
their missions. The more powerful entry under the system is usually the more closed organization, since its day-to-day focus so
often concerns pressure politics.
C. Special Interest Pressures

Unlike bureaucracy and conflicts of interest, special interest
pressures are found outside the formal decisionmaking process.
But powerful special interest pressures do not operate in a vacuum.
They often make use of what may seem to be broad public inducements such as jobs and other economic growth factors. In many
cases, a view of the disproportionate amount of permanent injury
to the environment in contrast to the transitory economic benefit
derived from a given development project renders it difficult to
believe that decisions are really made on the merits. Perhaps the
preponderance of decisions in favor of development as against en,0' The Governor has only appointed one member with a strong public perspective to the
MAPCC. Mich. House Concurrent Res., June 6, 1974, provides authority and resources for
the Joint Committee on Conflicts of Interest. Neither this, nor S.B. 1377 and S.B. 1378
(which purported to prescribe standards of order for public officials and to increase the role
of the State Board of Ethics) deal with most of the conflicts of interest presented.
110 Oil and Gas Regulation Laws, MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 319.31 (Supp. 1974-75).
111 See section VI in PART Two of this article.
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vironmental protection can be explained in terms of the selfserving tendency of the bureaucrat to favor the regulated industry.
Most often, the promoter and developer have well-paid expert witnesses, high-priced counsel, effective lobbyists, and expensive presentations, while the public side of the question is often supported
only by government servants on the working level whose very
candor and effectiveness may have denied them the top rungs of
the bureaucratic ladder.
Thus, it is a standard tactic for companies like Hillsdale
Foundry,1 12 Reserve Mining, 1 3 and Cleveland Cliffs Iron
(CCI), 1 1 7 to claim that they cannot afford to pay the costs of environmental protection. DNR and the other big state agencies are
anxious to believe them and make little demand for proof of such
claims or for a realistic appraisal of the consequences of particular
15
projects.
CCI, a consortium including Ford Motor Company and the Inland and Republic Steel companies, may offer a good illustration
of the environmental role of powerful special interest pressures.
CCI, with the enthusiastic support of the DNR Hydrologic Survey, sought permission to dam the Escanaba River to provide
water for its production of iron pellets in its new Tilden mine,
claiming this would produce as many as 1,000 new jobs and related
economic growth. 1 16 There was evidence that the Tilden Mine
could have been made to operate economically without the Tilden
dam and its inevitable environmental injury; that is, the company
admitted it would be able to acquire at least 93 percent of the water
11 7
needed by recirculating water from the mine's tailing basins.
Furthermore, while CCI claimed that the dam would be used to
regulate the flow of the Escanaba, it admitted the contrary at a later
hearing. 1 1 8 Environmental experts disputed CCI's claims that the
environment would not be disrupted. 119 There was an adverse environmental impact statement, 1 20 the preferable environmental al-

112See notes 75-81 and accompanying text supra; North Woods Call, June 12, 1974, at 6.
113 See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, Sept. 29, 1972, at 7B, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1973,
at 53, col. I; N.Y. Times, June 5, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
114North Woods Call, June 12, 1974, at 6.
"I For a more detailed discussion of the tactic see section VII in PART Two of this
article.
116 Detroit Free Press, Apr. 10, 1972, at IA, col. 2, 2A, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 20,
1972, at 59C, col. 2, 61, col. 3.
117 Detroit Free Press, Apr. 10, 1972, at IA, 2A.
118 Id.
119 Id.

120 Mich. Dept. of Natural Resources Bull., May 3, 1972, at 1-4, summarizes DNR's
"working draft" on the project's environmental impact.
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ternative of bringing in water from Lake Superior was not fully
explored,'
and an inadequate cost-benefit analysis was
prepared.'
During construction a causeway was built without a
permit.123 But CCI made glowing promises of a thousand new jobs
and received the support of the Hydrologic Survey, even with
respect to the causeway.' 2 4 The NRC Chairman reluctantly

shifted the burden of proof to favor CCI by holding that, since CCI
claimed it could not afford to build the Tilden Mine complex without the cheap water from the Tilden dam, and since DNR was
"incapable"

issue.

of determing if this was true, the permit should

125

CCI used quite a different strategy in order to apply its special

interest pressures on the shores of the Great Lakes and along such
natural streams as the Two Hearted River. CCI's desire to develop its land holding for a maximum profit was thwarted by the
existence of the Natural River Act of 1970126 and the Shorelands

Protection and Management Act,1 27 two of Michigan's better environmental laws. Under this legislation the Two Hearted River,
for example, would have been designated a "wilderness river" and
its shores would be so zoned as to bar new construction, subdivisions, commercial developments, and dams. Somewhat similar
protections would have been applied to the Great

Lakes

shorelands .128
CCI's answer was simple. Using strong legislative influence,
CCI sought enactment of S.B. 419, the so-called "Natural Areas

Preservation [sic] Act '1 29 written by the CCI lawyers. 130 Although the legislation masqueraded as an environmental bill, it
would have required the state to purchase outright any land it

121 Detroit Free Press, June 2, 1972, at 12C, col. 1,reports a United Auto Workers
proposal that this jobs-environment controversy may be resolved by bringing in water from
Lake Superior, a suggestion that was not adopted.
2 See note 117 and accompanying text supra; note 124 and accompanying text infra;
North Woods Call, June 6, 1973, at 1,8.
123 North Woods Call, Apr. 4, 1973, at 1;id., Apr. 11,1973, at 4.
124 Although construction of the causeway was inconsistent with the environmental impact statement, the Hydrologic Survey later came to the rescue by claiming that they had
authorized the causeway. North Woods Call, Apr. 4, 1973, at 1.
125 North Woods Call, June 12, 1974, at 6. It is not clear why the permission sought could
not have been conditioned on providing the state with appropriate facts.
126 MICH. Comp. LAWs ANN. §§ 281.761-.776 (1970).
127 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.631-645 (1970).

128 See the Shorelands Protection and Management Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
281.632 (1970), which is made specifically applicable to the Great Lakes shoreline by Sections 2(f) and 2(h).
29 1972 Legislature. North Woods Call, Nov. 21, 1973, at 1, 5; id., Dec. 12, 1973, at 4.
130 Detroit Free Press, Nov. 25, 1973, at 1;North Woods Call, Feb. 6, 1974, at 1.
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sought to protect for natural habitats or general public use. This
surrender of the state's ordinary police powers to protect the public would have cost about $2 billion,1 3 1 which the legislature would
never have appropriated. The Governor's office stated that he opposed S.B. 419, but the Governor was strangely silent about the
matter in public. 132 Two environmentally sympathetic state
representatives finally blocked passage of the bill.' 3 3 CCI's pressure tactics still accomplished a number of its goals because DNR,
apparently frightened by S.B. 419 and the related publicity campaign against the preservation of wild rivers, came up with a
"compromise" zoning plan that abandoned real protection of the
Two Hearted River's banks and permitted development of lots
13 4
along the river.
Another typical, and not unrelated, example of the operation of
such powerful special pressures can be seen in the exemption of
logging and mining interests from the coverage of the 1972 Soil
Erosion and Sedimentation Act' 35 -mining and logging are major
sources of the erosion that the Act sought to prevent. 13 6
Michigan's ability to resist such powerful special pressures is
significantly weakened by the lack of a priority environmental plan
and by the lack of executive leadership. For example, an investigation in 1973 disclosed widespread abuses and deception of the public in connection with resort land sales.1 37 As a result, a Land Sales
Act was proposed that would have required the real estate industry
to inform buyers of environmental and other conditions affecting
land they bought. The real estate dealers, the banks, and other
components of the real estate lobby put such intense pressure on
the legislature that a provision was included exempting all subdivisions of twenty-five lots or more from these disclosure
requirements.1 38 For all practical purposes this amendment vi131 Detroit Free Press, Nov. 25, 1973, at 1.
132

Id.

13' North Woods Call, Feb. 6, 1974, at 1.

,34 North Woods Call, Oct. 10, 1973, at 3, describes a compromise zoning plan. The paper
reported actions of H. Doehne, Chief of the DNR Wild Rivers program.
At CC I's request he agreed to abandon the Wild River law set back and green
belt provisions on the Two Hearted River. Instead he proposed to accept
CCI's proposal that the river's wilderness be protected [sic] by establishing
minimum lot sizes of 10 acres.
North Woods Call, Aug. 15, 1973, at 1, 6.
135 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 282.116 (1972).

136 Earth Beat, Nov. 9, 1973, at 2.
137 Detroit Free Press, Mar. 30, 1973, at I.
138 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 565.801 et seq. (1974). North Woods Call, Nov. 21,
1973, at I; id., Jan. 16, 1974, at 3; id., Jan. 23, 1974, at 4.
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tiated the Act and permitted the real estate industry to avoid its
disclosure requirements. 13 9 Furthermore, after the Department of
Licensing and Administration failed to develop the necessary rules
for enforcing the act in time for its original April 1, 1973, effective
date, 140 the real estate coalition took advantage of this happy
"coincidence" by persuading the legislature to postpone the effective date of the Land Sales Act until October 1, 1973.141 This delay
had the practical effect of allowing owners of subdivisions containing twenty-five or more lots another six-month selling season without having to worry about any statutory duty of disclosure.
The heavy-handed approach of many commercial special interests is aptly demonstrated by the controversy over the Pigeon
River country. 14 2 The Pigeon River country is the last large tract of
wilderness land in the Lower Peninsula of Michigan, and it is the
last habitat of numerous wildlife herds. Such values-not susceptible to balance sheet determinations-are unimportant to the oil and
gas interests who seek drilling rights in the Pigeon River Wilderness. The oil and gas interests are supported not only by big
economic power, but also by the attitudes of local inhabitants who
claim that their "private property rights" allow them to do as they
14 3
wish with their "own" land.
Given this background, it is not surprising that a local attorney
who acted as hearing officer on a request for an oil well drilling
permit in the Pigeon River country granted the permit despite
largely unchallenged testimony about the environmental damage
that such drilling would cause. 14 4 An Assistant Attorney General
stated that such a well would be "an environmental insult" and
that he was "appalled" by the hearing examiner's opinion, the
implication being that the decision was so erroneous as to raise
questions as to its objectivity. 145 Although the NRC reversed the
examiner, 146 analogous questions continue to be raised about
DNR's purporting to develop a management plan for the Pigeon
River country while failing to allocate sufficient personnel or resources to the project.

139 North Woods Call, Jan. 16, 1974, at 3.
140 North Woods Call, Mar. 4, 1973, at I.
141

Id.

142 Detroit Free Press, Feb. 27, 1972, at 3A, col. 1,7A, col. I; Ann Arbor News, Nov.

21, 1971, at 37, col. I.
143Id.
144 See note 145 infra.
145 North Woods Call, Jan. 16, 1974, at I, 5.
146 North Woods Call, May 1, 1974, at 4.
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Because of the high cost of litigation, the courts may not really be
open to those seeking to protect the Pigeon River country if appeals ensue.' 4 7 At the very least, then, this example illustrates the
obstacles to open decisionmaking on environmental issues. The
special interest need only "win" once to be free to exploit the
environment, while the environmental side must hold the line
every time to avoid the irreversible effects of development.
D. Possible Wrongdoing

At some point agency action may cross over the line between
special interest pressures, conflicts of interest, or suspiciously partisan bureaucracy, and cases of explicit wrongdoing. The distinctions may be subtle.
It is rarely necessary for productivity interests to resort to explicit corruption. Indeed, the number of situations suggesting literal wrongdoing that could be assembled for this article was quite
limited. The real problem is still the corrupting influence of factors
such as bureaucracy, conflict of interest, special interest pressures,
and inadequate perspectives or planning. These are "corruption"
in the more subtle sense that such factors are conducive to a closed
decionmaking process.
The Bear Mountain case,' 148 involving the illegal development of
a resort on state land at Grayling, Michigan, and the possible misuse of more than $1 million in federal funds invested in the resort,
wound up with a grand jury investigation. There are still unanswered questions about who benefited from these uses of state land
and the integrity of certain state organizations involved. But, oddly
enough, the entire investigation seems to have faded away.
Whenever a government agency is slow to enforce its environmental obligations or is eager to assist or defend production and
development despite an apparent clash with the environment, the
public is entitled to a full explanation. Though DNR fishery
biologists predicted that the Consumers Power Company
pumped-storage generating plant at Ludington, Michigan, would
destroy many fish 149 and that Consumers Power's dams on the Au
Sable River would deteriorate river water quality,' 15 0 DNR mys-

'4' North Woods Call, Aug. 21, 1974, at 1.
14s Detroit Free Press, Nov. 29, 1972, at 3A; id., Nov. 30, 1972, at 5A; Detroit News,
Mar. 4, 1973, at 14B, col. 1.
149 North Woods Call, Jan. 30, 1974, at I, 5; id., Feb. 6, 1974, at 4.
150 North Woods Call, Feb. 6, 1974, at 4.
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teriously ordered its biologists to be silent and apologized to Consumers Power for newspaper articles containing these
predictions.151
Regardless of the classification of these shortcomings, the system as a whole stands for more than just a generic pattern of state
decisionmaking. In conjunction with operational and conceptual
factors examined below,1 5 2 it bears a real relationship to the loss of
public confidence in the government and in the political system.
Watergate, if properly understood, is not merely an exercise in
criminality; it is also a demonstration of the failings of traditional
institutional techniques for the distribution of decisionmaking
power. These established practices appear to center on the organization and operation of a closed system of government-one which
provides little access to broad public interests. When judged by
such a standard, the Michigan government can not be considered
free of these problems; rather, it must be viewed as a part of them.
Ultimately, it is the public, whose preferences are reflected by
representatives in Lansing and Washington, from whom the problems and the solutions must derive.
V.

To IMPLEMENT ADEQUATE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND OBLIGATIONS, AND THE
EFFECT OF INADEQUATE OR CONFLICTING LAWS
THE FAILURE

The group of explanatory factors considered above 153 are structural. They serve largely to describe the system and its organization. The focus of the remainder of Part One of this article is on the
effects of the system, concentrating on its functional and conceptual shortcomings. Basic to the ensuing analysis is the fact that
Michigan tends to follow the ad hoc approach of traditional market
economics, and its accompanying common law concepts such as
the nuisance doctrine.
A. The General Thrust of Michigan's
Environmental Laws - The "NuisanceInternalization" Approach
An appraisal of Michigan law as a function of Michigan's environmental decisionmaking process requires that two general
questions be answered: first, from a substantive standpoint, does
the pattern of Michigan laws correspond to the priority needs of
151 Id.;

see also note 85 and accompanying text supra.

2 See section V infra.
153

See section IV supra.
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Michigan environmental correction? This question must include a
consideration of the coverage of the environmental laws as well as
an inquiry into the openness of the decisionmaking process. The
second question is functional: are the laws efficient and effective in
achieving the substantive goals the legislature has established? The
adequacy of relevant penalties and the currency of the laws play an
important role in evaluating functional success.
Since the substantive adequacy of the laws has been dealt with in
earlier portions of this article, this section will emphasize the functional inadequacies of Michigan's environmental laws. Of course,
it is not always possible to distinguish between substantive and
functional adequacy. For example, a loophole may be deliberate or
else be due to poor drafting.
Despite the general language about planning in many of the
Michigan environmental protection acts, 15 4 it appears clear that
most of these provisions are precatory at best and cosmetic at
worst. For example, despite the language directing MAPCC to
adopt a "comprehensive plan, ' 155 in practice the result has been
far from that. 15 6 Furthermore, the provisions for long range management plans under the Natural River Act of 1970157 and for
environmental studies under the Shorelands Protection and Management Act' 58 have encountered such barriers as the DNR's concessions to CCI and the land use pattern of local property owners
along the Two Hearted River. 15 9
It is also noteworthy that in a number of areas where planning is
particularly important, the legislation is silent on the subject. This
includes laws concerning the reclamation of metallic mining
1 62
lands, 160 snowmobile registration, 16 1 restricted use pesticides,
63
and oil and gas regulation. 1
But it is not only in the missing, inadequate, or cosmetic provisions for properly planned management that Michigan environmental legislation falls short. Most of these recent environmental
laws 1 64 focus only upon an individual sphere of problems.The reliance of a number of Michigan environmental statutes upon indi154See, e.g., MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 323.1 et seq. (Supp. 1973).

1 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.1 (1967).
,5 See generally sections VI and VII in PART Two of this article.
,57MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.761 et seq. (1970).
158 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.631 et seq. (1970).

,59See section IV C supra.
160

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 425.181-.188 (Supp. 1974-75).

161MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.1501 -. 1518 (Supp. 1967).
162 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 286.161 - .173 (Supp. 1967).
163 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 319.1-.27 (Supp. 1967).

164See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.1 et seq. (1967).

WINTER

1975]

State Management of the Environment

vidual economic and tax sanctions16 5 is further evidence of the
basic thrust of Michigan environmental legislation. The strategies
of these laws are isolated and uncoordinated. Such statutes usually
16 6
address only a single environmental problem.
This fractionated and unplanned approach indicates that Michigan legislation reflects a very limited grasp of the importance of an
integrated strategy. The current pattern is largely modeled on the
highly individualized, largely nonintegrated approach of market
16 7
economics, as reflected in the common law of nuisance.
The nuisance economics approach has always been inadequate
as a strategy for resource management, both because of the conceptual and practical limitations of nuisance law as a substitute for
land use planning, 6 " and more basically because nuisance law embodied, but did not develop or extend, the basic problem-solving

165 Among the Michigan statutes providing various types of tax incentives or relief for
pollution control are: Industrial Development Revenue Bond Act of 1963, MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.1251-1267 (1967); Farmland and Open Space Preservation Act,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §554.701.719 (Supp. 1974); Natural River Act of 1970, MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.761-.776 (1967); Registration and Regulation of Snowmobiles,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.1501-. 1518 (Supp. 1974-75).
166 See, e.g., Shorelands Protection and Management Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 281.631.645 (1967); Natural River Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
281.761-.776 (1967); and the Solid Waste Disposal Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§
325.291-.300
(1967).
67
See M. McDOUCAL & D. HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, AND LAND 439 (1948).
168 Most of the elements of common law nuisance reflect the narrow or closed treatment
of general public interests that has been discussed in detail herein. The doctrine of"balancing the equities," and, to a lesser degree, the choice of damages rather than injunction,
reflect a weighting of the decision process in favor of productive enterprise, judged by size
and/or number of jobs involved. See Hulbert v. Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118
P.2d 928 (1911); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
The doctrine of "coming to the nuisance" completely ignores the economic reality of the
plaintiff who had little choice but to move into a dingy industrial district. See, e.g., Schuck,
Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER 475 (1969). Furthermore, nuisance law generally is an area of conceptual confusion. Prosser, Nuisance
Without Fault, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 399 (1942). The necessity of choosing between nuisance,
trespass, or other concepts often reflects a continuation of the absurdities of the common
law forms of action. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Burnham v. Beverly
Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942); Swetland v. Curtiss Airports, 55 F.2d 201
(6th Cir. 1932); Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. den.,
U.S. 654 (1937), for an illustration of this confusion in one area of the law. More
significantly, nuisance is another ad hoc resolution that provides little means for dealing with
environmental problems in a planned manner. Typical of the inadequacies of the nuisanceinternalization approach to environmental land use problems is Spur Industries v. Webb
Development Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972). In that case, the court found neither
injunction nor damages appropriate for resolving a land use conflict between the developer
of a new town and an established feedlot operation. This was because the controversy had
been forced into the rubric of "nuisance." The court finally granted an injunction to one side
and damages to the other - a poor substitute for a more managed approach. See also
Piekarski, Enjoining a Public Nuisance, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER 157 (1974).
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16 9

Market economics

defines pollution as an "externality;" that is, as a cost of doing
business which is actually inflicted on a person external to the

business. Economists argue that the remedy is to "internalize" the
pollution; i.e., to shift its burden back to the polluter by charging
him an amount roughly equivalent to the damage done the
victim. 170 Thus, nuisance doctrine usually requires the polluter to
pay a monetary penalty to the individual victim in an amount that
would compensate the victim for his damage, and thereby neatly
"internalize" pollution.
Most state pollution laws have started in this same direction by
providing penalties for injury-causing pollution or by offering tax
and other incentives to the polluter. They thereby sought to "internalize" the external injury as between plaintiff-victim and
defendant-polluter instead of focusing on the overall problem. The
latter includes the question of how to take account of the public
and environmental interests at stake, many of which are not well
represented by individual plaintiffs. Injunctions are available only
as a last resort and only on an ad hoc basis resulting from "balancing the equities.' 17 1 The common law approaches were amended
to include a system of permits, but the amendments continued to
focus on individual plaintiff-victims and consequently did not embody any major advances in environmental management.1 72 In
states such as Michigan, environmental statutes have not gone a
great deal beyond the codification of public nuisance law.
9 See Baxter, The SST, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38-57 (1968); Samuels, Interrelations
Between Legal and Economic Processes, [1968] LAW & ECONOMICS 435; D'Arge & Hunt,
Environmental Pollution, Externalities and Conventional Economic Wisdom, [1970]
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 266-84. See also section VI in PART Two of this article.
170 This approach is also present when, as in Michigan, the polluter is paid, via tax credits
or otherwise, for assuming one of his own costs of doing business (pollution control).
171 The close relationship between these industry arguments and the traditional nuisance
doctrine of "balancing the equities" (see note 168 supra) is apparent.
172 Given the limitations discussed in the nuisance-internalization strategy, it was to be
expected that the statutory codification of nuisance approaches, whether in the relatively
pristine form of a public nuisance law or in the somewhat more advanced form of a permit
requirement, would still fall short of the ideal. The basic approach was still individualistic
and closed. Many of the Michigan environmental laws involve requirements for permits,
licenses, registration, or similar administrative procedures, but in spite of their broad planning language, they focus on isolated problems without real planning or integration.
The "effluent charge systems" urged by almost every traditional economist (and rejected
by almost every environmental administrator) are but a variant of the individual permit
systems embodied by many state statutes. All of these approaches share the same defect;
instead of damages or injunctions, they use "effluent charges" or "1899 Permits" which
have the same basic goal of "nuisance-internalization." Thus, they, too, avoid integrated
management. As the federal EPA's approaches to environmental administration grew more
sophisticated, less was heard of the 1899 Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411,413 (1964), and
its nineteenth century approaches to water management. Perhaps the ultimate in such arguments for the use of effluent charges and tax incentives is to be found in Hock, Constitu-
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A common environmental problem-airport noise and the injury
it does to neighboring land holders-offers a practical illustration
of these general arguments. A typical legal/economic solution to

this situation is for the court to label it as nuisance, trespass, or
taking as between the plaintiff land holder and the defendant air-

port, airline, or manufacturer. 173 But the problem of airport noise
is not just an issue of how much damage defendant should pay
plaintiff; the question itself is wrong. The larger issue is the rela-

tionship between commerce by air and the right of the surrounding
community to reasonable use of its land. The public interests at
stake have minimal access to economic and legal decisionmaking.
Questions about the proper planning of transportation by air, 174 the
patterns of land use surrounding airports, and the relationship of
both to economic growth remain unresolved.
The proper handling of the airport noise problem would require
consideration of potential injury to the upper and lower
atmosphere 7 5 by airplanes, the effects of various patterns of air-

plane traffic, and an examination of the technology that can practicably be imposed upon airplane manufacturers and airlines. 176 The
decisionmaking process must meet the difficulty of persuading
governmental agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administra-

tion to grant to public interests the same elaborate consideration
received by airplane manufacturers and the airlines. 177 The special
immunities of the military present further obstacles. Finally, the
problems of how best to allocate the related economic burdens
among manufacturer, user, and the general public, as well as
among national and local units of government, must be fully explored.

tional ConsiderationsAssociated with Pollution Taxes, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER
97 (1964), which contains solemn discussion of the constitutional and other "legal" aspects
of a possible uniform national pollution tax. These comments are not intended to suggest
that permits, effluent charges, tax incentives, or disincentives may not play a useful role in
the management-of environmental systems if they are part of an integrated approach. But if
the permits, effluent charges, and taxes are administered from the perspective of
"nuisance-internalization" as a substitute for rational management, then progress in the
area is unlikely.
173 See note 168 supra for cases relating to airport noise; Berger, Nobody Loves an
Airport, 43 CAL. L. REV. 631 (1970); Berger, You Know I Can't Hear You When the Planes
Are Flying, 4 URBAN LAWYER 1 (1972); Huard, The Roar, the Whine, the Boom and the
Law, 9 SATNTA CLARA L. REV. 189, 197-204 (1969); Note, Inverse Condemnation and
Nuisance, [1971 ] SYRACUSE L. REV. 793.
174 Id.
17' N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1972, at 10, col. 1; Detroit Free Press, Feb. 12, 1973, at IA,

col. 3.
176 Hearings on S. 1016 and S. 1566 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation., Senate Commerce Comm. 92d Cong., 1st SESS: 627-28, 663-80, 741-51 (1971).
177 Id.
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Part of the explanation for the inadequacies of the system is the
psychology of market economics. Traditional economic theory assumes that a reliance on human acquisitiveness as the sole motivation for social action will either adequately explain the economy or
provide leverage to deal with wants and needs of society that extend beyond individual acquisition. Individual supply and demand
curves are, however, unable to deal with public interests such as
education, the equitable distribution of resources, or health. Wherever a social problem is so complex, so pervasive or so much a
product of disparate bargaining power as to require concerted public action, the random play of individual acquisitiveness is unlikely
to solve the problem.
Michigan law and its underlying executive and legislative thinking have not progressed significantly beyond the nuisanceexternalities approach to environmental problems. This is not to
suggest that monetary penalties, permits, injunctions, or tax incentives and disincentives, are undesirable or that they should be
abandoned. But such methods will not contribute to environmental
problem-solving unless they are integrated into a broader management perspective.
B. Specific Shortcomings of Michigan's
EnvironmentalLaws
Judged by sheer weight and volume of shelf space, Michigan's
environmental laws compare favorably with those of other states.
Unfortunately, Michigan's laws are also largely obsolete, ambiguous, or conflicting. Michigan statutes frequently lack the effective
sanctions and the efficient procedures which are essential to effective environmental administration. Few 178 question the need for
recodification and clarification of Michigan's loose mass of environmental statutes. The courts have referred to such ambiguous
and tortuous laws and have described one such law-the Drain
Code-as being "an exceedingly complex statute, the provisions
of which apparently are known by few in the profession and understood by far fewer."1 79 Problems of form and clarity, however, are
not the most serious shortcomings of Michigan's environmental
statutes. This section will attempt to list briefly some of the more
significant ways in which functional or substantive statutory defects have handicapped environmental protection.
See generally interviews on file with author.
Ray v. Drain Commissioner, 48 Mich. App. 559, 210 N.W.2d 810 (1973), vacated, 393
Mich. 294, 224 N.W.2d 883 (1975). The Michigan Supreme Court decision represents the
first such decision on the merits under the EPA of 1970.
178

179
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Some enabling statutes do not provide the full range of authority
agency administrators require to meet their environmental protection goals. WRC and MAPCC lack express authority to deal with
emergency air pollution or water pollution episodes 80 despite the
fact that the Governor has called for such authority in the past. 8 1
Specific rules as to the posting of property against intruders, the
requiring of written permission for nonowners to come upon land,
and the spelling out of arrest authority under various circumstances would clarify troublesome problems. 18 2 Although
Michigan has a number of statutes forbidding trespass on another's
property, these statutes do not clearly define the relationship of the
183
recreationist, the hunter, or the snowmobiler to the landowner.
The farmer or other landowner may thus be harassed by thoughtless interlopers who destroy property; as a result, further open
space may be barred to the general public.
In some instances the omissions in a statute's coverage are relatively limited and may have been overlooked in the drafting process. But other gaps are so extensive as to suggest a deliberate
policy choice by the legislature. If the public believes that the
passage of environmental legislation means that the problem has
been solved, special pressures have yet another opportunity to
defeat public interests. For example, although disclosure of extensive fraud in connection with resort land sales led to demands for
reform, the real estate lobby vitiated the effectiveness of the Land
Sales Act 184 by persuading the legislature to exempt subdivisions
of fewer than twenty-five lots from its coverage. 18 5 The legal defects in the Subdivision Control Act of 1967186 have had a similar
frustrating effect, since the Act defines subdivision as excluding all
parcels over ten acres in area. 1 87 Legislation was recently proposed to include parcels up to forty acres each and to add a County

180 Roush, Statutory Water Pollution Control-the Michigan WRC Act: Observations and
Suggestions, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 131, 158-59 (1972). Roush points out that when confronted
with large mercury discharges by Wyandotte Chemicals in 1970, the WRC was able only to
request the Attorney General to act, whereas other states have statutory authority to take
action in emergencies.
"8I There is still no emergency abatement procedure for water quality (or other areas).
Roush, supra note 180, at 158. The WRC does have a small emergency fund it can use for
spot clean-ups.
182 MICHIGAN

NATURAL

RESOURCES

COUNCIL,

THE

TRESPASS

QUESTION,

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (May 20, 1974); North Woods Call, June 12, 1974, at 4.
183 Id.

MICH. COmP. LAws ANN. § 565.801 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75).
185 See notes 137-41 and accompanying text supra.
186 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 26.430 (1967).

184

187 Id.
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Plat Coordinating Board to make it more difficult for developers to
1 89
lobby individual county officials, 8 8 but it was not passed.
There are many other examples of Michigan environmental laws
where an important area of coverage or an important enforcement
power has been omitted. Logging and mining interests are exempted from coverage by the Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Control
Act of 1972190 despite the fact that mining and logging are sources
of the erosion that the Act sought to prevent. 1 9 ' The Dam Act 9 '
does not contain an explicit requirement that environmental,
nonengineering factors be considered in the issuance of dam
permits,' 19 3 although the prohibition of pollution is listed as one of
its objectives. Had the language been more definite, it might have
helped to open the DNR Hydrologic Survey's decisionmaking
processes to factors other than productivity. Somewhat similarly,
state statutes fail to require that river impoundments for lake developments be subject to state regulation where they occur on
nonnavigable waters. 9 4 As most private lake developments are
not on "navigable" rivers, very few have been subjected to damming regulation. 195
Even where Michigan's laws do not literally omit important
areas of environmental need, enforcement and procedural provisions may remain inadequate. One weakness of both air and water
quality laws has been the cumbersome procedures and resulting
enforcement delays. 9 6 Another gap in enforcement provisions has
been the failure to require the polluter to make a full and detailed
disclosure of the nature and amounts of his emissions.' 9 7 Nor is
there a uniform pattern to the sanctions that are provided. The
"voluntary compliance" approach to industry has often meant that
statutory fines were rarely invoked. Most of the penalties have
H.B. 5570, 1972 Legislature. Earth Beat, Sept. 27, 1974, at 2, 3.
189 Apparently, the reason for the disinterest in H.B. 5770 was that the already thin ranks
of environmentalists were hopelessly split by the fact that hearings on H.B. 5770 were
scheduled at the same time as the Great Lakes Shorelands Conference in Traverse City,
Michigan. Id.
188

190 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 282.101 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75).

191 See notes 135-36 and accompanying text supra.
192 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 281.132(b) (Supp. 1974-75).
193 See M. WERNETTE,
ENVIRONMENTAL THOUGHTS ON MICHIGAN'S PRIVATE
RECREATIONAL LAKE DEVELOPMENTS, 6, 7, (1971) [hereinafter cited as M. WERNETTE],

on file at Wayne State University Law School.
194 M. WERNETTE, supra note 193, at 5; see also Bartke, Commentary: Filling and
Dredging in Michigan, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1515 (19721); Bartke, Dredging, Filling and
Flood Plain Regulation in Michigan, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 861 (1971).
195 M. WERNETTE, supra note 193, at 5.

196See Roller, Michigan Air Pollution Control, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 89 (1972); WRC
Note, supra note 4, at 445.
197 See Roller, supra note 196; Roush, supra note 180.
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been random, bearing
little relationship to such
"nuisance-economics" 198 goals as the amount of injury or the cost
of correction. 199 Monetary and other penalties have varied among
types of pollution as well as among jurisdictions within the state.2 0 0

Reliance on remedies such as citizen suits can mean little against
the background of such disarray. Furthermore, Michigan laws
omit adequate provision for court costs and legal fees in citizen
suits, 20 1 and fail to provide for the critical expenses of expert
testimony .202
198 See section VI in PART Two of this article; notes 165-66 and accompanying text
supra.
199Id.
200 Id. The air and water quality laws limit air pollution surveillance fees to a range of $25
to $8,000 and water pollution surveillance fees to a range of $50 to $9,000. These amounts do
not adequately reimburse the state for the cost of the related administrative functions.
Roush, supra note 180, at 148-50.
201 The Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201 et
seq., provides only that costs may apportioned to the parties if justice requires and is silent
as to the legal expenses. The burden which this leaves on under-financed public groups
illustrates the way in which the decisionmaking system is relatively closed to the general
public interest in environmental protection. The Administrative Conference of the United
States, recognizing the problem of inadequate finances, has suggested pro bono representation, allowing attorney fee awards or money to meet the legal expenses of public intervenors. Note, Public Interest Right to Participatein FederalAdministrative Agency Proceedings, 47 INDIANA L. REV. 682, 701 (1972). Proposals by the Ford Foundation to cut
back its grants to public interest law firms have underlined the scope of the problem. Ford
Foundation Considers Reduction of Grants to Public Interest Law Firms, [1973]
ENVIRONMENT REP. 895-96. The situation has been helped by the tendency of the courts to
recognize suits by "private attorneys general," and to award attorney fees to plaintiffs. See,
e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364
F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973); Section 505 FWPCA of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et
seq. (1971) (permitting any party to be awarded attorney or expert witness fees).
There is another important aspect of this problem which reflects the continuing clash
between economic growth and the environment: discrimination by the Internal Revenue
Service against public interest organizations in the granting of tax exemptions and the
deductibility of contributions, which lie at the heart of a public interest group's ability to
obtain money. Business has long been able to deduct most of its extensive lobbying costs,
mostly on behalf of special interest goals, either as business deductions for legal fees and
other "business" expenses, or through such provisions as the lobbying deductions permitted under § 162(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See Cooper, The Tax Treatment of
Business GrassrootsLobbying, 68 COLUT. L. REV. 801 (1968); Borod, Lobbying for the
PublicInterest-FederalTax Policy andAdministration, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1987 (1967). On
the other hand, §§ 501(c)(3) (exemption) and 170(c)(2) (deductibility of contributions) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 deny such deductions if a "substantial part" of the donee's
activities is "carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation." It is
difficult to find a rational basis on which to deny tax exemption to the League of Women
Voters, a rigidly nonpartisan organization (League of Women Voters v. United States, 180
F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960)), while many special interests
are able to take lobbying deductions. The result is a barrier to the consideration of
noneconomic, public interests, such as those generally espoused by public interest law firms
or organizations like the League. For a detailed analysis of some of the ways in which the
federal income tax decision process is far more receptive to special interests than to public
interests, see I G. Lanning, Some Realities of Tax Reform, Compendium of Papers on
Broadening the Tax Base 10, submitted to the House Committee on Ways and Means, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
202 In the debate over MERB, a Governor's aide argued that MERB should emulate the
state agencies in soliciting free assistance from academic experts. But the state agencies
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A problem that is basic to much of the organizational and functional weakness of Michigan's environmental laws is poor draftsmanship. This is true not only of the Drain Code,2 0 3 but of
Michigan's energy, zoning, planning, and land use enabling laws as
well. 20 4 One such ambiguity was among the factors that led to a
substantial revision of Michigan water quality laws and their penalties, which were intended to avoid federal government preemption. The Michigan WRC Act2 0 5 contained a provision imposing fines for illegal discharges into state waters. But this same
section ambiguously stated:
However the person shall not be subject to the penalties of this
section if the discharge of the effluent is in conformance with
and obedient to a rule or order of the Commission.
The obvious weakness which this language created was among the
factors that led to the amendment of the WRC Act to make it
conform to federal EPA requirements. In this case, fortunately,
the obvious loophole created by the language was eliminated.20 6
A second ambiguity is a continuing source of inter-agency jurisdictional conflict. The Inland Lakes and Streams Act 2 0 7 provides
in Section 3(0208 that the construction of ditches into an inland lake
or stream is forbidden without a permit. But the Subdivision Control Act of 1967,209 in Section 194(c), 2 10 permits approval of a plat
within a flood plain even if the flood plain is altered, as long as the
flood plain's original discharge capacity is preserved and other
riparian rights are not affected. The Hydrologic Survey took advantage of this uncertainty to continue authorizing drainage projects into public waterways at its discretion, instead of complying
with the permit requirement of the Inland Lakes and Streams
Act. 2 11 The Survey permitted a developer to construct four ditches

themselves are so short of expert assistance that they rely on expertise from the industries
being regulated. The first alternative, therefore, is usually unavailing; the second poses the
most classic of conflicts of interests. See notes 56 and 112 and accompanying text supra.
203 MICH. Comp.LAWS ANN. § 280 (1967). See note 179 and accompanying text supra.
204 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 65.801 et seq.
205 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.10 (1967), as amended (Supp. 1974-75).
206 This language was included in § 10 of the WRC Act only in 1972. Because the legisla-

ture wished to avoid federal pre-emption of the Michigan water quality program, it finally
eliminated the offending phrase while stiffening the law's sanctions generally. See generally
WRC Note, supra note 4.
217 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 281.951 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75).
200 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.95.3(0. (Supp. 1974-75).
209 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 560.101 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75).
210 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 560.194(c) (Supp. 1974-75).

" MICH. CosMp. LAWS ANN. § 281.951 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75).

WINTER

1975]

State Management of the Environment

into the East Branch of the Paw Paw River without21 2the required

permit, explaining that "this is one that got away."

Despite the urgency of many of these problems, Michigan politics has tended to maintain local centers of power and to reject

solutions on a state or regional level. 2 1 3 The failure of recent efforts
to achieve any state-wide coordination of land use planning is one
good illustration, 2 14 as is the continuing absence of any real regional authority for organizations such as the Southeast Michigan

Transportation Authority (SEMTA).2 1 5 Of course, more than
political parochialism is involved. The bias of some regional organizations such as SEMTA2 1 6 or the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan
Authority 217 in favor of suburbs and against the inner city has
hardly increased their acceptability.
Michigan's environmental laws are inadequate in several basic

ways. They are conflicting, weak, and inefficient; their thrust is
disunified and uncoordinated. They are, in many respects, the

approach which Congress set forth in
converse of the integrated
2 18
the federal NEPA.

212 Earth Beat, Apr. 19, 1974, at 2, notes the effect of this overlap in the state's laws in
permitting the Hydrologic Survey the leeway that resulted in the Paw Paw River episode.
The conflict between the two statutes has been partially resolved through appointment of a
committee, No. 346, [1972] Mich. Pub. Acts, consisting of DNR, the State Drain Board, and
the Highway Department to oversee storm drains and headwalls that are claimed to be
exempt from the requirement of the Inland Lakes Act.
2'3 See, e.g., Wood, The American Suburb and the New Metropolis, in DEMOCRACY
IN URBAN AMERICA, 120, 174 (0.Williams & C. Press, eds. 1969); Feiler, Metropolitanization and Land Use Parochialism, 69 MICH.L. REV. 655 (1971); Harris, Economic Aspects
of the Metropolitan Region, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (1975); X. SILVERMAN, COUNTY
HOME RULE: AN APPROACH TO METROPOLITAN PROBLEMS IN MICHIGAN 655 (1971).
214 See section VII in PART Two of this article.
212 See Jackson, Planning for Environmental Improvement in Southern Michigan 42
(1971) (seminar paper on file at Wayne State University Law School), noting that SEMTA
has no taxing power or other real authority.
216 SEMTA argued against even exploring any new technology for Detroit's urgently
needed rapid transit system. This is an extraordinary position for such an agency to take.
See Jackson, supra note 215, at 43-44.
217 Although Detroit provides the great bulk of the funds for the Huron Clinton Authority, and although the great majority of the persons affected by the Authority's activities live
in Wayne County, each of the Authority's five counties has one vote. As might be expected,
most Huron-Clinton projects are located outside Wayne County, and the few within Wayne
County have been placed many miles from the inner city. Jackson, supra note 219, at 18,
notes that SEMCOG (Southeast Michigan Council of Governments) and CHPC (Community Health Planning Council) are similarly weighted against Detroit. Unfortunately, the
current U.S. Supreme Court seems unlikely to upset such violations of the one-man, onevote principle. See Note, Salyer Land Co. v. Talare Basin Water Storage District: Opening
the Floodgates in Local, Special Government Elections, 72 MICH. L. REV. 868 (1974).
218 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
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The need for a substantive recodification of Michigan environmental law is evident, but the political obstacles are great. One
major problem is the apparent failure of legislators and the public
to understand the direct importance to them of many of these environmental problems and the real threat posed to their safety and
their way of life. This lack of understanding, in turn, is directly
connected to the lack of effective political leadership and to the
failure of most of the media to adequately grasp and perceive the
scope of the problem and to present it to the public. 219 These are
among the reasons for the dismal record of environmental legislation.

219

See section III supra.

